Reading the Crypto Classics: Canetti, Goldreich, and Halevi: “The Random Oracle Methodology, Revisited”

Organizer: Shan Chen, TU Darmstadt, Cryptoplexity Group

Abstract

This is the fourth talk in the seminar series “Reading the Crypto Classics” for the winter term 2021/22. The idea of this seminar is to jointly read classical milestone papers in the area of cryptography, to discuss their impact and understand their relevance for current research areas. The seminar is running as an Oberseminar, but at the same time meant to be a joint reading group seminar of the CROSSING Special Interest Group on Advanced Cryptography with all interested CROSSING members being invited to participate.

This issue will cover the paper

Canetti, Goldreich, and Halevi: “The Random Oracle Methodology, Revisited” (STOC 1998); available at https://dl.acm.org/doi/pdf/10.1145/1008731.1008734 with the following abstract (extracted from the introduction):

“We take a critical look at the relationship between the security of cryptographic schemes in the Random Oracle Model, and the security of the schemes that result from implementing the random oracle by so called ”cryptographic hash functions“. The main result of this article is a negative one: There exist signature and encryption schemes that are secure in the Random Oracle Model, but for which any implementation of the random oracle results in insecure schemes. In the process of devising the above schemes, we consider possible definitions for the notion of a ”good implementation“ of a random oracle, pointing out limitations and challenges.”

Further information about the virtual format

For participation the following Meeting Link is required:
https://tu-darmstadt.zoom.us/j/81673767756?pwd=cDlwSnFIcTYrSDhwRXlRNlhQWDR6dz09

More information

CROSSING Wiki