DAC: July 19-23, 2020 | USENIX: August 12-14, 2020
Organizer: Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi (CROSSING, TU Darmstadt)
The recent outbreak of microarchitectural attacks that are being continuously uncovered has shown us the hard way that our trust assumptions in the underlying hardware of our computing systems and security architectures are unjustified. Besides microarchitectural design flaws, System-on-Chip (SoC) designers often use third-party intellectual property (3PIP) cores and in-house IP cores to design their SoCs. Trustworthiness of such SoCs can be undermined by security bugs unintentionally introduced during the implementation and integration of these IPs. Each SoC has its own defined usage scenario and corresponding security objectives. When exploited, a security weakness often results in compromise or bypass of at least one of the product security objectives. As we have already witnessed, attacks may lead to a system failure or deadlock , or generate a side channel to remotely access sensitive information (e.g., cryptographic keys), or gain privileged access to the system enabling them to bypass the security mechanisms in place and compromise the whole computing platform.
The goal of this competition in its third edition in a row is to develop practical and effective solutions and computer-aided tools to identify such vulnerabilities more efficiently in buggy SoC, with a special focus on theory, tooling, and automation.
Suppported by the Collaborative Research Center CROSSING.