(Organized in the context of the hiring process for the new cybersecurity professorships.)
Worldwide companies and government agencies work on building large, scalable quantum computers, e.g., the NSA has budget dedicated to “Penetrating Hard Targets”, including an ongoing effort to build a “cryptologically useful quantum computer”, which (if successful) will render all of today’s Internet public-key cryptography obsolete. On the defense side, research in post-quantum cryptography has grown over the last decade, now leading to recommendations, such as those from the PQCRYPTO project, for systems that remain secure under attacks by quantum computers. However, these systems put significant burdens on the users in terms of bandwidth and computing power and are still insufficiently analyzed.
A new generation of efficient post-quantum cryptographic solutions is needed, along with a detailed study of their security and suitability for secure implementations. This talk will highlight some recent results and ongoing work on practical post-quantum cryptography, including a new lattice-based encryption scheme and side-channel attacks on lattice-based cryptography.