Due to their high efficiency and their strong security properties, lattice-based cryptographic schemes seem to be a very promising post-quantum replacement for currently used public key cryptography. The security of lattice-based schemes has been deeply analyzed mathematically, whereas little effort has been spent on the analysis against implementation attacks.
In this paper, we start with the fault analysis of one of the most important cryptographic primitives: signature schemes. We investigate the vulnerability and resistance of the currently most efficient lattice-based signature schemes BLISS (CRYPTO 2013), ring-TESLA (AfricaCrypt 2016), and the GLP scheme (CHES 2012) and their implementations. We consider different kinds of (first-order) randomizing, zeroing, and skipping faults. For each of the signature schemes, we found at least six effective attacks. To increase the security of lattice-based signature schemes, we propose countermeasures for each of the respective attacks.
Nina Bindel graduated with a M.Sc. in Mathematics from TU Kaiserslautern (Germany) in April 2014. Since June 2014 she is working as a PhD candidate in the Cryprography and Computeralgebra group lead by Johannes Buchmann. Her field of research focuses on the design and analysis of lattice-based primitives, especially lattice-based signature schemes.