Reading the Crypto Classics: McEliece: “A Public-key Cryptosystem Based on Algebraic Coding Theory”

2020/05/06 10:00-11:00

Speaker: Samed Düzlü, TU Darmstadt, QPC Group | Location: Online

Organizer: Christian Janson

This talk is the third one in the seminar series “Reading the Crypto Classics” for the winter term 2019/2020. The idea of this seminar is to jointly read classical milestone papers in the area of cryptography, to discuss their impact and understand their relevance for current research areas. The seminar is running as an Oberseminar, but at the same time meant to be a joint reading group seminar of the CROSSING Special Interest Group on Advanced Cryptography with all interested CROSSING members being invited to participate.

This issue will cover the paper

Dolev, Dwork, and Naor: “Nonmalleable Cryptography” (SIAM Journal on Computing 2000) (DOI: 10.1137/S0097539795291562)

with the following abstract:

"The notion of nonmalleable cryptography, an extension of semantically secure cryptography, is defined. Informally, in the context of encryption the additional requirement is that given the ciphertext it is impossible to generate a different ciphertext so that the respective plaintexts are related. The same concept makes sense in the contexts of string commitment and zero-knowledge proofs of possession of knowledge. Nonmalleable schemes for each of these three problems are presented. The schemes do not assume a trusted center; a user need not know anything about the number or identity of other system users.

Our cryptosystem is the first proven to be secure against a strong type of chosen ciphertext attack proposed by Rackoff and Simon, in which the attacker knows the ciphertext she wishes to break and can query the decryption oracle on any ciphertext other than the target.

Further information