Organizer: Nina Bindel, CROSSING/TU Darmstadt
The supersingular isogeny Diffie-Hellman (SIDH) protocol has become one of the most popular key exchange mechanisms that is conjectured to be secure against large-scale quantum computer attacks. Equipped with the most compact keys among post-quantum candidates, SIDH inherits the rich arithmetic that made elliptic curve cryptography so popular in the last couple of decades. In this talk, we will discuss our efforts to advance the case of this isogeny-based cryptosystem for practical application.
This includes the design of an IND-CCA key encapsulation scheme called SIKE, the selection of efficient parameters matching NIST-recommended security levels, and its efficient implementation on popular Intel and ARM platforms.
Patrick Longa is a researcher and developer with the MSR-T Security and Cryptography team at Microsoft Research, in Redmond.
He completed his Ph.D. in Electrical and Computer Engineering at the University of Waterloo in 2011, after which he briefly occupied a post-doc position in the Department of Combinatorics and Optimization (C&O) of the same university. During his time at Waterloo, he was a member of the Centre for Applied Cryptographic Research (CACR) and the Laboratory for Side-Channel Security of Embedded Systems.
His research interests mainly involve elliptic curve and pairing-based cryptography, post-quantum cryptography, efficient algorithmic design, high-performance implementation of cryptographic primitives, and side-channel analysis attacks and countermeasures.