

The Future of Security


Bart Preneel
imec-COSIC KU Leuven

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Trend 1

IoT makes IT more intrusive




IoT markets (source: Intel)

A SPECTRUM OF SMART STUFF

The IoT contains an enormous variety of connected objects, including:

TINY STUFF SMART DUST

Computers smaller than a grain of sand can be sprayed or injected almost anywhere – to measure chemicals in the soil, or to diagnose problems in the human body.



ENDORMOUS STUFF AN ENTIRE CITY

Fixed and mobile sensors dispersed throughout the city of Dublin are already creating a real-time picture of what's happening, and will help the city react quickly in times of crisis.




How fast will IoT grow?

BY 2020, HOW MANY DEVICES WILL EXIST?

2020	Gartner	26 Billion Units
	Cisco	50 Billion Units
	Intel	200 Billion Units
	IDC	212 Billion Units

Source:
[1] <http://www.gartner.com/newsroom/id264616>
[2] <http://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/solutions/industrial-internet-of-things/infographic-guide-to-iiot.html>
[3] <http://news.cisco.com/Internet-of-Things.html>
[4] <http://www.idc.com/article/internet-of-things-8-9-billion-market-in-2020-212-billion-connected-things/>



Intrusive unavoidable stealthy

IoE security risks



DID IRAN HIJACK U.S. DRONE?

Mirai botnet, a DDoS nightmare turning Internet of Things into Botnet of things


IoE security risks

Low cost
Large attack surface
Hard to update



Market for lemons
Tragedy of the commons
Lack of regulation





Trend 2

Big Data and Data Analytics for Security






Big data is high **volume**, high **velocity**, and/or high **variety** information assets that require new forms of processing to enable enhanced decision making, insight discovery and process optimization.

veracity



Gartner, 2010








Big Data for Security

If you have no visibility of your systems, how can you secure them?

Prevention is hopeless: if you detect all incidents, you can stop the bad guys in a cost effective way (read: you can reduce investments in prevention)

By applying analytics to incident data sets, we can learn how the bad guys behave and detect them even faster next time around




A metafor

Thinking of
Big Data in terms
of pollution



Trend 4: Big Data for mass surveillance

« Who knew in 1984... »



... that this world would be big Brother ... »



... and the Zombies would be paying customers ? »



NSA calls the iPhone
users public 'zombies'
who pay for their own
surveillance



It's the
metadata
stupid



Which questions can one answer with mass surveillance systems/bulk data collection?
Tempora (GCHQ) ~ Deep Dive Xkeyscore (NSA)



- I have one phone number – find all the devices of this person, his surfing behavior, the location where he has travelled to and his closest collaborators
- Find all Microsoft Excel sheets containing MAC addresses in Belgium
- Find all exploitable machines in Panama
- Find everyone in Germany who communicates in French and who use OTR, Signal or Telegraph

BND has spied on EU (incl. German) companies and targets in exchange for access to these systems



industry



government


users



Mass Surveillance

panopticon
[Jeremy Bentham, 1791]

discrimination
fear
conformism - stifles dissent
oppression and abuse



NSA is not alone



2nd Party Five Eyes		NATO (28 countries)						SSEUR 14-Eyes				
		NZL	AUS	USA	CAN	GBR						
3rd Party (33 countries)				FRA	NLD	DNK	NOR			SWE	FIN	
				DEU	BEL	ESP	ITA			AUT		
				JPN	KOR	POL	CZE	HUN			FYR	ISR
				PAK	IND	THA	HRV	ROU			DZA	TUN
				SGP	TWN	GRC			TUR	ETH	SAU	UAE
				ISL	EST	LVA	LTU					
				LUX	SVK	BGR						
				PRT	SVN	ALB						

Nations with 2nd and 3rd Party status and membership of the SIGINT Seniors Europe (SSEUR) and NATO (situation of 2013 with NATO country codes)


Electropages.net 2014

Trend 5



The Crypto Wars will return continue

San Bernardino, CA, December 2, 2015







We are going dark



“[I]n our country, do we want to allow a means of communication between people which we cannot read?”




France and Germany push for encryption limits



Trend 6

Nation state hacking and cyber arms proliferation

The collage includes a map of the world, a large building, a person in a lab coat, and a computer screen displaying a map of the United States.



]HackingTeam[
Rely on us.

Remote Control System

THE HACKING SUITE FOR GOVERNMENTAL INTERCEPTION

We believe that fighting crime should be easy: we provide effective, easy-to-use offensive technology to the worldwide law enforcement and intelligence communities

(Part of) government seems to prefer offense over defense

How many 0-days does the FBI and the NSA have?

Are they revealed to vendors?

If so when?

New 0-days

2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
13	15	9	12	14	8	14	23	24	54

We need a Digital Geneva Convention

Microsoft President Brad Smith:
"Nation states are hacking civilians in peace time"

RSA Conference 2017





Optimism is a moral duty

Architecture is politics [Mitch Kaipor'93]

Avoid single point of trust that becomes single point of failure



COMSEC - Communication Security

Secure channels: still a challenge

- authenticated encryption studied in CAESAR <http://competitions.cr.yp.to/caesar.html>

Forward secrecy: Diffie-Hellman versus RSA

Denial of service

Simplify internet protocols with security by default: DNS, BGP, TCP, IP, http, SMTP,...

Or start from scratch: Gnunet [Grothoff+], SCION [Perrig+]

COMSEC - Communication Security

meta data



Hiding communicating identities

- few solutions – need more
- largest one is TOR with a few million users
- well managed but known limitations
 - e.g. security limited if user and destination are in same country

• Location privacy: problematic



COMPUSEC - Computer Security


Protecting data at rest

- well established solutions for local encryption: Bitlocker, Truecrypt
- infrequently used in cloud
 - Achilles heel is key management
 - Territoriality

Secure execution

- essential to avoid bypassing of security measures

From Big Data to Small Local Data



Distributed solutions work

Root keys of some CAs



Skype (pre -2011)

Cryptocurrencies



Distributed systems with local data

Many services can be provided based on **local** information processing


- advertising
- proximity testing
- set intersection
- road pricing and insurance pricing

Cryptographic building blocks: ZK, OT, PIR, MPC, (s)FHE

Almost no deployment:

- massive data collection allows for other uses and more control
- fraud detection may be harder
- lack of understanding and tools

From Big Data to Encrypted Data



Centralization for small data

exceptional cases such as genomic analysis

- pseudonyms
- differential privacy
- searching and processing of encrypted data
- strong governance: access control, distributed logging

fascinating research topic but we should
favor local data
not oversell cryptographic solutions

Open (Source) Solutions

Effective governance

Transparency for service providers



EU-FOSSA

EU Free and Open Source Software Auditing

Conclusions (research)

Rethink architectures: distributed

Shift from network security to system security

Increase robustness against powerful opponents who can subvert many subsystems during several lifecycle stages

Open technologies and review by open communities

Cryptomagic can help



Conclusions (policy)

Pervasive surveillance needs **pervasive collection** and **active attacks** with massive collateral damage on our ICT infrastructure

Back to targeted surveillance under the rule of law

- avoid cyber-colonialism [Desmedt]
- need industrial policy with innovative technology that can guarantee economic sovereignty
- need to give law enforcement sufficient options

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<http://www.ecrypt.eu.org>



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Further reading

Books

Glenn Greenwald, No place to hide, Edward Snowden, the NSA, and the U.S. Surveillance State, Metropolitan Books, 2014

Documents:

<https://www.eff.org/nsa-spying/nsadocs>
<https://cfe.org/snowden>

Articles

Philip Rogaway, The moral character of cryptographic work, Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2015/1162

Bart Preneel, Phillip Rogaway, Mark D. Ryan, Peter Y. A. Ryan: Privacy and security in an age of surveillance (Dagstuhl perspectives workshop 14401). Dagstuhl Manifestos, 5(1), pp. 25-37, 2015.

More information

Movies

Citizen Four (a movie by Laura Poitras) (2014) <https://citizenfourfilm.com/>

Edward Snowden - Terminal F (2015) <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Nd6qN167wKo>

John Oliver interviews Edward Snowden https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XEVlyP4_11M

Snowden (a movie by Oliver Stone) (2016)

Zero Days (a documentary by Alex Gibney) (2016)

Media

<https://firstlook.org/theintercept/>

http://www.spiegel.de/international/topic/nsa_spying_scandal/

Very short version of this presentation: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uYk6yN9eNfc>