Primitives

Cryptography-based security solutions heavily rely on cryptographic primitives such as encryption and signature schemes. However, existing primitives are threatened by attacks which are made possible by new computing architectures and algorithms. Also, new cryptographic solutions require efficient primitives with new functionalities such as fully homomorphic encryption. Thus, the goal of this project area is the development of the required cryptographic primitives. They must be efficient in present and future computing environments, and must resist novel attacks due to new hardware platforms and algorithmic advances.

P3 - Hardware-Entangled Cryptography

 

Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs) are a promising approach to realize minimal trust anchors for embedded devices. This project will design novel PUF-based security primitives. On top of this, it will build efficient and scalable PUF-based device identification and authentication schemes providing intrinsic protection against basic hardware attacks. The project will develop a formal security framework to analyze the security of the developed solutions according to modern cryptographic standards.

Researchers

Ghada Dessouky

System Security Lab

Interests:

  • Secure Computation.
  • Hardware-based Security.
  • Reconfigurable Devices.

Nikolaos Athanasios Anagnostopoulos

Security Engineering Group

Interests:

  • Hardware security.
  • Internet of Things (IoT).
  • Embedded systems.
  • Special focus on the security applications of Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs).

André Schaller

Security Engineering Group

Interests:

  • Hardware-based security.
  • Security for embedded systems.
  • Internet of Things.
  • Lightweight cryptography with a strong focus on Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs).

CROSSING Publications P3

Additional Attributes

Type

ATRIUM: Runtime Attestation Resilient Under Memory Attacks

Shaza Zeitouni, Ghada Dessouky, Orlando Arias, Dean Sullivan, Ahmad Ibrahim, Yier Jin, Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi
In: 2017 International Conference On Computer Aided Design (ICCAD'17), November 2017
[Inproceedings]

LO-FAT: Low-Overhead Control Flow ATtestation in Hardware

Ghada Dessouky, Shaza Zeitouni, Thomas Nyman, Andrew Paverd, Lucas Davi, Patrick Koeberl, N. Asokan, Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi
In: 54th Design Automation Conference (DAC'17), June 2017
[Inproceedings]

Intrinsic Rowhammer PUFs: Leveraging the Rowhammer Effect for Improved Security

André Schaller, Wenjie Xiong, Nikolaos A. Anagnostopoulos, Umair Saleem, Sebastian Gabmeyer, Stefan Katzenbeisser, Jakub Szefer
In: 2017 IEEE International Symposium on Hardware Oriented Security and Trust (HOST), February 2017
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
[Online-Edition: www.hostsymposium.org/]
[Inproceedings]

Eliminating Leakage in Reverse Fuzzy Extractors

André Schaller, Boris Skoric, Stefan Katzenbeisser
In: IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security, 2017
[Article]

Boot Attestation: Secure Remote Reporting with Off-The-Shelf IoT Sensors

Steffen Schulz, André Schaller, Florian Kohnhäuser, Stefan Katzenbeisser
In: ESORICS 2017 - European Symposium on Research in Computer Security, p. 437-455, 2017
Springer
[Online-Edition: https://www.ntnu.edu/esorics2017]
[Inproceedings]

SFB 1119 - Contact


Contact P3

Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi
System Security Lab
Mornewegstrasse 32
64293 Darmstadt

Stefan Katzenbeisser
Security Engineering Group
Computer Science Department
Technische Universität Darmstadt
Hochschulstrasse 10
64289 Darmstadt

 

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