Four papers accepted at top conference ACM CCS

2018/07/30

Four papers accepted at top conference ACM CCS

Success for CYSEC and CROSSING researchers

Two papers from the group of CROSSING-PI Prof. Sebastian Faust (Applied Cryptography) have been accepted:

Generalized State Channel Networks
Stefan Dziembowski, Sebastian Faust und Kristina Hostakova
In: 25th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS), 2018

An extension of virtual payment networks to cryptocurrencies are so-called state-channel networks. In addition to simple virtual off-chain payments, they enable the execution of complex smart contracts in dicrect channels and channel networks. In this work, we give a first full specification for general state channel networks. Moreover, we provide formal security definitions and develop security proofs showing that our construction satisfies security against powerful adversaries.

FairSwap: How to fairly exchange digital goods
Stefan Dziembowski, Lisa Eckey und Sebastian Faust
In: 25th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS), 2018

In this paper we introduce FairSwap – a new protocol for a fair exchange of digital goods over smart contracts. Our solution has two distinctive features that make it particularly interesting for large files: the cost of running the smart contract on the blockchain is minimal, and instead of expensive cryptographic tools such as zero-knowledge proofs, simple hashing techniques are sufficient.


A paper from the groups ENCRYPTO of CROSSING-PI Prof. Thomas Schneider and SecEng of CROSSING-PI Prof. Stefan Katzenbeisser has been accepted:

HyCC: Compilation of Hybrid Protocols for Practical Secure Computation
Niklas Büscher, Daniel Demmler, Stefan Katzenbeisser, David Kretzmer, Thomas Schneider.
In: 25th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS)


A paper from CROSSING PIs Prof. Michael Waidner and Dr. Haya Shulman has been accepted:

Domain Validation ++ for MitM-Resilient PKI
Markus Brand, Tianxiang Dai, Amit Klein, Haya Shulman, Michael Waidner
In: 25th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (ACM CCS), 2018

The security of Internet-based applications fundamentally relies on the trustworthiness of Certificate Authorities (CAs). We practically demonstrate for the first time that even a very weak offpath attacker can subvert the trustworthiness of popular commercially used CAs. We propose countermeasures to mitigate our attacks.


ACM CCS 2018 is taking place October 15-19 in Toronto, Canada.

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